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GATS and the New Developmentalism: Governing
Transnational Education
RAVINDER SIDHU
This article introduces a relatively recent development, the inclusion of ed-
ucation as a tradable service under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s)
General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS). I focus on two Trade in
Education Services forums—one in Washington, DC (USA), and one in Syd-
ney (Australia)—to investigate the discursive strategies used to promote trade
in education in the multilateral context. I identify the truth regimes that are
concretized and the strategies used by both state and nonstate actors to
define, codify, and delimit the discourse on trade in education. I argue that
these strategies help create the conditions for a broader “epistemic lock in,”
where various authorities associated with education are steered toward le-
gitimizing a “new developmentalism,” namely, the reconfiguration of trade
liberalization as a developmental tool. By framing the liberalization of trade
in education in moral terms, as the means to alleviate global poverty and
bridge the development divide, the implications of a GATS-sanctioned com-
mercial agenda are rendered invisible. Using governmentality as a theoretical
and methodological framework, I begin the inquiry into the discursive re-
construction of transnational education with the question of how ideas about
trade liberalization are globalized. If globalization is imagined as flows, then
what exactly is flowing across transnational education spaces? What kinds of
ideas and practices are being transnationalized, and what are their “biopol-
itical”1 and geopolitical effects?
There are five interconnecting sections in this article. Section 1 intro-
duces governmentality, the tool used to investigate the multileveled scales of
governance that have created the conditions for trade liberalization’s status
as a “regime of truth.” Briefly, “regimes of truth” refer to a series of historically
specific, power-inflected rules and mechanisms for determining what is true
and what is false (Dean 1999, 23; O’Farrell 2005, 70). Section 2 first describes
how governmentality may be used in the critical analysis of discourses of
globalization (Larner and Walters 2004a, 2004b). Next, it introduces the
I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers and the coeditors for their helpful comments.
1 The term “biopolitical” is derived from Foucault’s notion of biopower, a technology that emerged
in the late eighteenth century for managing populations. “Biopolitics” refers to the politics underpinning
the management of populations.
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conceptual construct of transnational/global governmentality, which is used
to interrogate educational developments in the multilateral context (Larner
and Walters 2004b). Section 3 describes the politics of global trade and
canvasses the implications of GATS for education. Section 4 moves on to
examine existing discourses about trade in education, taking two Trade in
Education Services forums as sites for knowledge production. An analysis is
undertaken of the kinds of techniques used to shift debates from the explicitly
commercial and trade-centered focus of the first forum to a refocused and
reworked development agenda. These discursive strategies have been pivotal
in securing greater acceptance for the liberalization of trade in education
among developing countries. Section 5 revisits some of the key themes
sketched out in the article. It reexamines the regimes of truth associated with
the trade-in-education platform and questions the emancipatory promises of
the broader trade-liberalization agenda.
Governmentality
Governmentality Defined
Simply put, governmentality is a framework first developed by the French
historian Michel Foucault for understanding how authority and power are
exercised through the applications of knowledges, communities of experts,
forms of calculation, and all manner of techniques, strategies, and activities
(Foucault 1994, 201–22). A central premise in governmentality is a recog-
nition of the productivity of power—its capacity to shape choices and aspi-
rations, form knowledges, induce pleasures, and create things (Foucault
1980). Mitchell Dean (1999, 11), following Foucault, summarizes government
as “the more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity
of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques, forms of knowl-
edge that seek to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations,
interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of
relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes” (emphasis
added).
Governmentality provided the basis for Foucault to reconceptualize the
relations among the liberal state, its population, and individual citizen-sub-
jects. Here, the term “liberal” is used to refer to the philosophy of political
liberalism.2 The liberal state’s primary concern—population, territory, se-
curity—was premised on security for its populations as a basis for creating
the conditions for the improvement of their health, wealth, and longevity.
Foucault coined the term “biopower” to explain the management and reg-
ulation of populations by the modern state in ways that ensure that maximum
benefit could be derived or extracted from human resources (Foucault 1994).
2 The use of “liberal” to refer to a political philosophy is not the same as contemporary uses to
indicate left-leaning political sensibilities.
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At the same time, the liberal state was also concerned with encouraging
individuals to self-manage and self-regulate their thoughts and behaviors, so
that the interests of the subject became aligned with that of the state (Foucault
1994). Governmentality, then, provides a way of understanding how “top-
down” technologies of domination are connected to “bottom-up” technol-
ogies of the self to govern. The latest variant of liberal governmentality iden-
tified by Foucault is neoliberal governmentality, or advanced liberal
government, where government is premised on using the market as an or-
ganizing principle for all types of social organization.
Governmentality offers a more nuanced and reflexive set of tools than
grand-narrative approaches, such as classical political economy frameworks,
for understanding the complex rubric of forces and processes and authorities
and agents that shape the power/knowledge relations governing education.
This article does not use governmentality as an alternative grand narrative
to political economy but rather seeks to provide a more nuanced picture of
the political and economic relations that are shaping education across, and
within, states and borders. It uses “midrange concepts,” such as the discourses
arising from trade-in-education seminars, to show how rationalities and prac-
tices articulate in differently contingent ways to give rise to the configurations
of power that shape the regulation and disciplining of education (Larner
and Walters 2004a).
A central criticism leveled at governmentality is its Eurocentrism. Because
he used the European nation-state as his focal point, Foucault attributed a
pivotal role to governance by and through freedom (i.e., choice and self-
empowerment) and paid less attention to freedom’s coexistence with dom-
ination (Hindess 2004, 30–31). Elaborating on this theme of the coexistence
of technologies of freedom and domination, and by extension, the coarti-
culation of liberal and illiberal governmentalities, Barry Hindess contends
that it is liberalism’s foundational belief in a historicist and developmental
view of humanity that is at the heart of this paradox. Thus, liberalism’s defense
of private property and individual rights is based on a selective use of freedom
and empowerment as a technology of government within the Westphalian
system of states. Marginal spaces and subjects within the imperial “centers”
and “peripheries,” by contrast, have long been sites for the deployments of
illiberal governmentality (Dean 1999, 131–33).
Applying an “Analytics of Government”
Pinning down a formal step-by-step method that applies the governmen-
tality framework is not without problems, given Foucault’s general appre-
hension about inculcating a “methodological fundamentalism.” To qualify as
a Foucauldian-inspired methodology, “it is imperative to examine the rela-
tionship between knowledge and the factors that produce and constrain it”
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(O’Farrell 2005, 52–53). Drawing on this, Dean (1999, 22–23) has developed
a four-dimensional grid to investigate the multifacetedness of governance:
Forms of visibilities.—The picturing and constituting of objects that are to
be governed, ways of seeing and perceiving “the problem” at hand;
Techne of government.—The means, tactics, technologies, and strategies
through which authority is constituted and rule legitimized;
Episteme of government.—The forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, and
calculation that arise from and inform the activity of governing;
Forms of identification.—The actors, subjects, identities, and agents that pre-
suppose the practices of government.
This article will apply Dean’s grid to analyze the discourses used to govern
transnational education. Because of space limitations, it will focus mainly on
visibilities and episteme (knowledge), although it is acknowledged that each
dimension “presupposes the other without being reducible to them” (Dean
1999, 23).
Globalization as a “Governing Mentality”
Despite the use of innovative theoretical approaches in its study, glob-
alization is most commonly conceptualized as a series of radical and un-
precedented transformations brought about by flows of people, capital, im-
ages, technologies, and ideas across space and time (Larner and Walters
2004b, 495). The use of governmentality as an analytic unsettles this con-
ventional story. Globalization is taken “not as a prediscursive phenomenon
and objective reality with particular causes and consequences but as a dis-
cursive event which emerged at a particular historical moment” (Larner and
Walters 2004a, 5). Treating globalization as a collection of discourses—ways
of knowing—that are deployed toward “convenient” ends by their various
subjects reduces the hold of the logic of inevitability and teleological rea-
soning (Hay and Smith 2005, 125). Put another way, “dedramatizing” glob-
alization frees the imagination and creates a discursive space for social action.
With this in mind, Wendy Larner and Richard Le Heron make the case for
researchers to shift their analytical focus from flows to the imaginaries that
inform flows (Larner and Le Heron 2002, 753–55).
The question of how notions such as global flows have traveled across
time and space and how they have come to be stabilized discursively and
materially has been the source of much recent research. Feminist and post-
structuralist researchers have pointed to the “globalization of ideas” by com-
munities of experts or epistemic communities.3 Given that the rationales and
logics for trade in education have relied heavily on discourses of globalization,
an awareness of the performative aspects of commentary on globalization is
thus insightful.
3 Massey 1999; Thrift 2003; Dicken 2004; Larner and Walters 2004a, 2004b.
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In their attempts to bring together both globalization and governmen-
tality, researchers have proposed the conceptual construct of transnational
or global governmentality, which is described as a dispersed, largely contin-
gent form of governance that embraces connections, relations, and processes
across different scales (Larner and Walters 2004a, 2004b). For James Fer-
guson and Akhil Gupta (2002, 991) transnational governmentality refers to
“new modes of government that are being set at the global scale. These
include not only the new strategies of discipline and regulation, exemplified
by programs such as those endorsed by the IMF [International Monetary
Fund] and the World Bank, but also the numerous coalitions and alliances
that constitute transnational social movements.” Importantly, the framework
of global governmentality does not privilege the supranational above other
scales, nor is globalism—the global order of things—reified. Instead, global
governmentality interrogates the discursive and historical dimensions of glob-
alism, including earlier global orders such as imperialism, internationalism,
and cosmopolitanism (Larner and Walters 2004b, 2).
The emergence of new forms of global governance is generally accepted,
although theorists and researchers differ in their approaches and analysis of
the forms they take. Stephen Gill (2003, 131–35) suggests that the transna-
tional governmentality that is authored by the WTO is animated by “disci-
plinary neoliberalism,” a reciprocal process that involves the production and
organization of knowledge, policies, and practices according to neoliberal
principles, and the use of such neoliberal knowledge and instrumentalities
to regulate, shape, and steer the behavior of individuals in the social body.
For Gill, institutions such as the WTO and multilateral regulatory regimes
such as GATS, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the European
Union’s Maastricht regimes create the conditions for a “new constitution-
alism,” sets of regulations, laws, policies, and practices animated by neoliberal
ideas and values. Where traditional notions of constitutionalism are associated
with political rights, obligations, and freedoms, the new constitutionalism,
according to Gill, confers privileged rights of citizenship to various forms of
corporate capital. New constitutionalist principles emphasize market effi-
ciency, the disciplining of public institutions, and limitations to democratic
decision making.
A parallel concept to new constitutionalism, but one operating at the
national scale, is graduated sovereignty, described by Aihwa Ong (2000, 57)
as “flexible experimentations with sovereignty by nation-states in response to
differently articulated power formations arising from, and in response to, the
broader global context.” The global is thus used to legitimate particular
domestic policies. Graduated sovereignty manifests in differential modes of
governing internal populations according to how they relate to the global
economy, as well as the use of various state instruments, laws, and policies
to create market-friendly environments for investors.
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Hindess’s analysis of governance in the contemporary world of advanced
liberal societies and the “peripheries” in the “global south” also provides a
useful context for understanding the implications for national and global
governance by instruments such as GATS. In the colonial past, governance
was shaped and informed by a civilizational grid—dividing populations ac-
cording to the level of advancement of their civilization. By contrast, in the
contemporary world of “sovereign” nations peopled by citizens, a more pal-
atable and politically congenial set of governing discourses is deployed,
namely, aid and trade. These discursive practices are premised on self-reliance
and improvement and captured in policy goals of “capacity building” and
“good governance.” Although their underlying rationalities rest on claims of
political neutrality and scientific legitimacy, their political-epistemic foun-
dations are informed by neoliberal notions of market value and neocolonial
ideas about difference, progress, and development (Hindess 2004; Phillips
and Ilcan 2004; Ilcan and Lacey 2006). While a great deal has been made
of the need to include the third world nation-state in partnership to facilitate
ownership of good governance and capacity-building agendas, force and
coercion remain a part of advanced liberalism (Jawara and Kwa 2003; Hindess
2004). Uncovering these power relations requires paying close attention to
the multifarious instruments, knowledges, and calculations used to opera-
tionalize participation and empowerment. It also involves investigating the
attributes and qualities depicted by empowered, participating subjects.
Politics of Global Governance
The World Trade Organization
The WTO was developed in 1995 following the Uruguay round of GATT
(General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs). It is made up of 146 member
countries, four-fifths of which are from the group termed “developing.” Be-
cause the WTO is able to impose sanctions in order to enforce its agreements,
it can ensure that market rationalities take precedence over other interna-
tional treaties and conventions, including those concerned with human rights
or environmental protection (Robertson 2003). The WTO’s objective is to
promote the liberalization of trade using the following rules: Most Favored
Nation (identical treatment for all foreign providers based on the best treat-
ment accorded to any one foreign provider), Transparency, National Treat-
ment (similar treatment of domestic and foreign producers), and Market
Access (WTO 2005).
The WTO regime has been proclaimed by its supporters to be democratic,
transparent, accountable, and development friendly. It is democratic in prin-
ciple because every nation has a single vote. However, in practice, some
countries exercise significantly more power than other countries in setting
trade agendas ( Jawara and Kwa 2003; Wallach and Woodhall 2004). In re-
sponse to accusations of secretiveness, the WTO has made efforts to construct
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a more “cosmopolitical” public face (Charnovitz 2004). In remodeling itself
as a more open institutional subjectivity, it has developed a more consultative
Web site through which a range of Web-based documents are made available,
including an online community forum (depicted in cartoon form).
Although the WTO is founded on the premises of a transparent, rules-
based, disciplinary, and regulatory regime, it does not operate in an open
“free” space but is linked to domestic and international power asymmetries.
In this context, the grip of neoclassical economics is reasserted through
circuits of geopolitical power and knowledge. Thus, the flexibilities and con-
cessions provided by the WTO to developing countries (“special and differ-
ential treatment”) are effectively blunted by bilateral means, allowing more
powerful economies to persuade weaker countries to adopt particular trade
agendas that are less development friendly. Regional bilateral agreements
promise increased market access but demand further concessions for foreign
investment and impose rules for intellectual-property protection, thus re-
ducing policy autonomy for national development and opportunity for up-
ward mobility (Glasmeier and Conroy 2003; Shadlen 2005). Having already
been subjected to liberalization imposed by IMF and World Bank–driven
structural adjustment packages, the bargaining power of some developing
countries is severely curtailed in both WTO negotiations and bilateral treaty
negotiations (Pritchard 2005; Shadlen 2006). Also, because the IMF and the
World Bank continue to adhere to neoclassical economic principles, they are
noted for exerting pressure on developing countries to drop any WTO-ini-
tiated protections in order to be eligible for loans. Further, as Bill Pritchard
demonstrates through a fine-grained analysis of the procedural workings of
the WTO’s dispute-settlement body (WTO-DSB), it functions first and fore-
most as a political mechanism to further trade liberalization. Thus, the rule
of market rules the law, and countries’ treaty-based rights under international
trade law are more often than not subordinated to the greater goal of lib-
eralization (Pritchard 2005).
Governance within and by the WTO is not just a matter of blocs of strong
states bent on promoting their national interests against homogenous cohorts
of developing countries. Blocs and nations are not univocal; they are made
up of competing and conflicting interests (Ford 2003). But more important,
trade liberalization’s appeal also rests on its status as a positive project of
government, offering the promise of increased market access for developing-
country commodities and opportunities for creating new productive capac-
ities (however limited). Compared to the opportunities for development
arising from regional and bilateral agreements, which are heavily imbricated
in “competitive liberalization,” a multilateral system of rules and collective
bargaining does appear to offer the better option for equitable trade out-
comes for developing countries.
At the same time, there are a host of reputable empirical studies pointing
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to the exercise of illiberal governmentalities in the realm of international
trade. Whether because of the cultural legacies of colonialism (Makki 2004;
Halliday 2005), the policies of the Washington consensus, or both, the welfare
benefits of trade liberalization have not been realized for many (least) de-
veloping countries (Dillon 1995; Shadlen 2005). The Doha development
round of trade talks that began in 2001 was initiated to rectify imbalances
from earlier trade negotiations, which disadvantaged the poorest countries,
but Doha remains deadlocked over the issues of agricultural subsidies and
protections and nonagricultural market access.
While the existence of realpolitik forces cannot be disputed, the position
of this article is that the power/knowledge effects from seemingly more
benign, unremarkable strategies merit closer attention. For example, how
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative conceptualizes a service is in-
structive: “[Services are] all around us . . . consisting of things that cannot
be packaged or built or held . . . ideas and efforts expressed in electrons,
on paper, film or the actions of people” (Zoellick 2003). Naming is a pro-
ductive act; it confers status and legitimacy. Marking out services in thought
and epistemology to include the tangible and intangible invests services with
an all-encompassing character and, more important, reconfigures every ser-
vice as property to be governed in ways that secure competitive advantage.
Bolstered by a legal doctrine aimed at “governing the intangible,” trade
treaties such as the GATS thus have the potential to introduce an adminis-
trative, intellectual, and bureaucratic machinery that successfully globalizes
property relations.
GATS and Education
The GATS is the first multilateral (global) trade agreement to establish
rules governing trade and investment in the service sector. In response to
developing-country concerns that efficiency and profit goals would subor-
dinate equity, national development objectives, and governmental autonomy,
it was decided that the principles of nondiscrimination or equal treatment
for all member states (Most Favored Nation) and transparent regulation
would be incorporated as general rules, while National Treatment and Market
Access would be optional. These principles would be binding only if countries
chose to commit to particular sectors, for example, financial services or ed-
ucational services.
According to GATS, there are four modes through which a service can
be supplied: mode 1 (cross-border supply, e.g., distance education), mode 2
(consumption abroad, e.g., movement of students to study overseas), mode
3 (commercial presence, e.g., overseas campuses), and mode 4 (movement
of natural persons, i.e., movement of people to deliver the service). Higher-
education services are largely traded as mode 2—consumption abroad—and
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
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countries, in particular the Anglo-Saxon countries, enjoy competitive advan-
tage, attracting some 85 percent of students (Larsen et al. 2004, 3).
In their discussion of GATS and the rescaling of educational governance,
Susan Robertson et al. (2002) offer a detailed analysis of the potential im-
plications for social cohesion and linguistic and cultural diversity by the
commercially driven imperatives of the WTO. This and other research high-
light the risks associated with GATS (Cohen 2000; Knight 2003; Ziguras et
al. 2003). Briefly, the issues of contention at present are the extent to which
GATS will interfere with the function of governments to regulate and fund
higher education. Although article 1.3 of GATS states that public services
(“services provided in the exercise of governmental authority”) are exempted
from GATS, most higher-education systems draw their funding from both
public and private (including individual) sources, leading to confusion as to
whether such hybrid models are noncommercial. Also unclear is how much
of private or public involvement makes a provider private in one geographical
setting and public in another. Article 6 presents particularly difficult nego-
tiation challenges, given the tensions between the regulatory responsibilities
of nations and the issue of what constitutes “unnecessary barriers” for trade
and investment (see Chand 2002; Barrow 2003; Scherrer 2005). Unresolved
too is the concern that the protections offered by GATS for education could
be subverted by “trade offs and package solutions,” as Christoph Scherrer
warns: “Much of liberalization in education comes as overspill from other
sectors’ free trade or protectionist interest and from the neoliberal consti-
tutionalist agenda espoused most forcefully by international organizations
such as the World Bank and the OECD” (2005, 79). Finally, concerns remain
that, through its ethos of progressive liberalization, GATS will steer education
toward ends that are unanticipated and unforeseen (Kelsey 2003). Given that
commitments made cannot be easily reversed (without compensation), this
raises the likelihood that poor policy choices will be fixed over time. The
next section examines the discourses, rationalities, and practices in the first
and the third Trade in Education Services forums, held in Washington, DC
(2002), and Sydney, Australia (2004), respectively.
Trade Discourses in Education
The 2002 Washington Forum
The first Trade in Education Services forum was held in Washington in
2002, with the OECD designated as a “broker” to bring together all the
stakeholders. A brief synopsis of the forum is now provided to illustrate how
problematizations were steered in particular ways so as to arrive at liberali-
zation of trade in education as the solution to a perceived crisis in education.
Through all of this, certain truths about the knowledge economy, the effec-
tiveness of public education, and the benefits of trade in education were
defined, codified, and delimited.
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An important participant at the forum, the World Bank, echoed the
thematic priorities in its 1998 world development report, Knowledge for De-
velopment, arguing that developing countries were stymied in their develop-
ment because of “knowledge gaps” and “information problems.” The Bank
took the position that an open trading regime—and foreign investment—
would enable countries to acquire the necessary knowledge to develop. By
adopting this position, the Bank helped to insert Hayekian economic ideas
into the episteme of development (Olssen and Peters 2005). Ignored were
the issues of “trade justice,” including how existing geopolitical and geoeco-
nomic relations might impinge on developing countries’ capacity to remake
themselves into “new knowledge economies.”
Similar in tenor was the OECD’s view that the “arrival” of the knowledge
economy was the result of globalization. Globalization and the knowledge
economy were thus held responsible for producing a “thirst” for overseas
higher-education credentials (Chen 2002). The urgency of responding to
this “new” era of the knowledge economy—an era as transformational as the
Industrial Revolution—was accentuated by coupling it with a discourse of
crisis (see also Robertson 2005). It was implied that the unrequited ambitions
of masses of frustrated youth denied education spelled apocalyptic possibil-
ities. The solution? Liberalization—opening up opportunities for foreign
nonstate provision.
By steering problematizations in particular ways, by invoking a crisis
around escalating and unmet demand for postsecondary education and the
arrival of a new mode of production—the knowledge economy—an episte-
mological reality was thus created, featuring trade and liberalization as gov-
erning rationalities. The liberalization of trade in education was read against
the normalizing narrative that trade in education already existed, evident in
the large numbers of students who traveled overseas to further their edu-
cation. Formalizing the governance of this commercialized transnational ed-
ucation space through GATS was presented as the next logical outcome, one
that would ensure accountability and quality assurance. This position took
the Anglo-Saxon education exporters as a reference point, while ignoring
the fact that relatively few countries in the world have education export
industries, even if international students are permitted to study in their ed-
ucation institutions (Scherrer 2005). These discursive maneuverings are also
instructive in understanding how space-time reconfigurations work as a po-
litical technology. A linear teleology premised on a Euro-American devel-
opment trajectory was used to promote the desirability and inevitability of
trade in education. To progress, nations, cultures, and societies everywhere
should aspire to become knowledge economies. Less thought was given to
“power geometries”—the insight that individuals, social groups, places, and
regions are placed differently in the flows and interconnections termed “glob-
alization” (Massey 1999).
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At the Washington forum, supporters of GATS such as the NCITE (Na-
tional Committee for International Trade in Education), an interest group
of for-profit American education service providers, argued that education’s
worth was better regarded in terms of how it might contribute more straight-
forward goals, including the creation of a world trading environment in which
foreign companies and educational institutions are not denied access to
markets (NCITE 2002, 2–3). The NCITE expressed its concerns in a rights-
based discourse that constructed a homogenized American education sector
whose members were victims of the vicissitudes of opaque, unfair foreign
procedures. They called for “the right to establish commercial operations and
the right to full majority ownership, the right to be treated on equal terms
with local providers” (NCITE 2002, 1; emphasis added). A more complex
and nuanced picture of the U.S. higher-education field was subsequently
obscured, including concerns by the American Council of Education (ACE)
that GATS could erode the autonomy of American institutions, while doing
little to protect developing countries from the worst excesses of America’s
marketized system such as the diploma mills.
The papers and presentations at the Washington forum also illustrate the
discursive tactics used to devalue the optics and rationales of GATS critics.
The concerns of public-sector education unions, in particular, were relegated
to the realm of irrationality, their reservations reported in emotional language
(“extreme view,” “strident,” “lack of trust,” “fanciful,” “false,” “inflammatory,”
“misleading,” and “fallacies”; see Sauve´ 2002, 12). Little or no attempt was
made to engage with their intellectually robust, careful empirical work, which
raised concerns about the impact of trade liberalization on the public good.
A salient and much-used discursive ploy, which runs through much of
the WTO-authored discourse including presentations at the first forum, is
to portray instruments such as GATS to be flexible, highly accommodating,
and animated by the principles of voluntarism and national sovereignty:
“Over 140 governments have chosen through membership of the WTO to
participate in a package of multilateral agreement because they recognise
the overall net economic and social benefits that accrue from a rules-based
trading system” (Sauve´ 2002, 16).
Statements like this function as “technologies of agency” by their con-
strual of countries’ participation in the GATS as a bottom-up, voluntary pro-
cess. Less powerful countries (e.g., least developed countries), therefore, are
constituted as active participants. For these countries, the identity of “willing
participant” establishes the basis for their being responsible for the future:
as willing participants in the WTO and GATS, they are subsequently respon-
sible for their end condition, whatever the outcomes might be, from the
liberalization of education. The language of participation creates an im-
pression of agency; however, as Suzan Ilcan and Anita Lacey (2006, 212)
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observe, “it is agency that is not acquired but bestowed or granted” by the
more powerful members of the WTO in accordance to political expediency.
To summarize, certain truths were legitimated and codified by the first
Trade in Education Services forum using a variety of strategies and calling
upon particular knowledges and authoritative sources. The first truth regime
was that an epochal transformation in world politics had created a fairer
multilateralism with GATS delivering mutual benefits to all parties. A second
truth regime rested on the view that open markets would bridge the knowl-
edge gap by making it easier to acquire technology, capital, and ideas, which
by extension would generate educational progress and economic and social
well-being for all (Sauve´ 2002; see also World Bank 1998).
The scope of this article does not extend to a genealogy of liberalization,
but it is certainly worth considering the question of how liberalization as a
category of thought acquired such amplitude. How has this rubric come to
be invested with so much power and authority and to be seen as the solution
to the problem of providing for the well-being of so many people and so
many countries? How has liberalization come to be rearticulated with a fairer
and more just globalism, where previously it might have been associated with
other forms of “global rule” such as imperialism and mercantilism?
Briefly, what is evident from an overview of the literature on trade lib-
eralization is the extent to which proof of its “success” is pinned on examples
drawn from selective geographies—the newly industrialized countries, or
Asian Tigers (see Little 1981; World Bank 1993). “New trade theorists,” how-
ever, have noted that the “Asian Miracle” was sustained by government in-
tervention antithetical to the “market-friendly” policies of open trade and
financial liberalization (Krugman 1986; Berger 2004). Further, as the Nobel
laureate and liberal economist Amartya Sen has noted, international trade
and competition were not the sole factors behind the success of the Tigers.
The “Miracle” was enabled by policies aimed at “broad based participation
in economic expansion such as good education policies to secure high levels
of literacy and numeracy, the provision of good health care, widespread land
reforms, the removal of barriers to economic mobility and state efforts to
foster gender equity” (Sen 1997).
Simply put, the neoclassical position derives its discursive legitimacy from
erasing the specificities of place and time: it does not convey the strategic
geopolitical importance of the Asian Tigers during the cold war era, and it
renders invisible those geographies where trade-liberalization policies have
failed spectacularly to sustain economic growth and address social inequalities
(Beeson and Islam 2005). Indonesia (once declared by the IMF to be a model
pupil), Zambia, Argentina—indeed, much of the Latin American continent—
provide a wealth of examples. In this vein, Daniel Schugurensky and Adam
Davidson-Harden (2003, 323) point to the “two decades of neoliberal ex-
periments [that] have already negatively impacted upon the capability of
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Latin America’s societies to pursue equitable social and economic develop-
ment.” Also rendered invisible in the discourse of liberalization are the social
and ethical consequences of the “cruel, intellectually bankrupt certainties of
neoliberalism” (Halliday 2005), which informed structural adjustment pro-
grams. These have severely disadvantaged some of the most vulnerable cit-
izens in the world—poor children in developing countries. For instance,
providing compelling evidence of irreversible deterioration in the health
status of children, John Peabody (1996, 823) highlights the ethical lapses
that arise when the temporalities of biological development are staggered to
fit with budgetary management programs: “Unique biologic events such as
neural development cannot be postponed even for a short period.”
The next section provides an analysis of the third Trade in Education
Services forum. At one level, its focus on capacity building pointed to a
welcome departure from the aggressively commercial focus of the first forum.
However, a closer reading suggests that the softer discourse of new devel-
opmentalism signals the emergence of an “inclusive” configuration of what
is an essentially neoliberal governmentality, which continues to promote trade
liberalization as the means of reducing global inequality. I select extracts
from speeches and panel discussions by the forum’s presenters to illustrate
the shifting and polyvalent discourses that make up the “new” trade-in-ed-
ucation agenda.
The 2004 Sydney Forum
Publicized as having an “Asia Pacific flavour,” the Sydney forum’s theme,
“building capacity and bridging the divide,” appeared to mirror the WTO’s
“new” commitment to development. Publicly, the trade agenda was promoted
as the means toward achieving cosmopolitan sensibilities and humanitarian
outcomes. Privately, the rules of marketing discourse celebrated “hard” mar-
keting over “softer” rationales. Dismissing as utopian sentimentality the “I
want to change the world” mentality, one marketing executive emphasized
his interest in “hard marketing” not the “soft stuff” (personal communication,
October 11, 2004). Notably, the rules that accord status and authority to mar-
keting authorities also play an important part in instilling an instrumentali-
zation of education. As this statement from a senior marketing executive shows,
employability is increasingly constructed as driving institutional reputation: “We
have to go out there and do research about what employers want. What do the
top banks in Shanghai want from their graduates? What do big multinational
firms want?” (personal communication, October 11, 2004).
Selling the liberalization agenda to its skeptics requires a modicum of
diplomacy and humility that emphasizes reciprocal benefits and win-win sce-
narios. This involves the reformation of particular relations between key op-
erant concepts and a reworking of space-time relations (Foucault 1971). At
the third Trade in Education Services forum, key authorities linked education
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markets to the myriad benefits arising from long-standing, nonmarket inter-
cultural educational encounters. Thus, in his opening speech, the head (sec-
retary) of Australia’s education bureaucracy, Jeff Harmer (2004, 2), observed:
“The benefits of trade in education go well beyond monetary value. . . . We
have been enriched by international students; we have contact with other
cultures, histories and societies in ways previously unimaginable. . . . [We
are] strengthening relationships. . . . Citizens in the global labour market
are more tolerant and understanding of other cultures. . . . Collaboration
of scientists and researchers is important for the economy of our countries.
. . . Outside provision challenges countries to think about their national
system.”
A set of new identities was created in discourse—citizens in the global
market—anticipated to be endowed with tolerance and understanding. A
coherent discursive formation, the global labor market, was anticipated to
create the conditions to support citizenship. In the context of a liberal trading
environment, trade terminology now deems “protectionism” to be a “bad”
principle. Those skeptical about trade in education were accordingly con-
ferred with a new identity—protectionist. Thus, the secretary, who was intro-
duced to the forum’s participants as “the CEO,” lamented that “there are
people who are protective of education systems. . . . Education is not suf-
ficiently liberalized. . . . Controversies remain” (Harmer 2004, 3).
Governmentality theorists have noted that the persuasive powers of po-
litical rationalities are best realized when they are embedded in character-
istically moral forms, for example, through references to notions such as
freedom, equality, justice, fairness, and economic efficiency (Rose and Miller
1992). At the third forum, the moral and social values of trade were reasserted
through the discourse of capacity building. Trade’s neoliberal character was
reworked and inserted into a developmental discourse of “doing good” for
the peripheries. The ethical reconfiguration of the trade agenda was partly
achieved by establishing a discursive common ground between the countries
of the North and South. Thus, Norway’s education minister, Kristin Clement
(2004, 2), declared that “Norway is an importer of education. . . . We share
this similarity with the countries of the South.” Given that Norway is one of
the wealthiest nations in the world, with a gross domestic product per capita
of $40,000, the relations of similarity are at best tenuous. Additionally, New
Zealand’s minister for education, Trevor Mallard (2004), noted that New
Zealand was “a poor country” and therefore could not provide much by way
of educational aid, although it was able to contribute to capacity building by
opening its doors to fee-paying international students. Like many of the
presentations at the forum, both of these ministerial speeches mirrored a
“new” trend found within developmentalist discourse—the reconstruction of
trade liberalization as a development tool.
Acknowledging that “there was mistrust” at the Washington forum, Nor-
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way’s minister of education was keen for the global order of things to con-
tinue, implying that “thinking global” is a natural human tendency that has
been stymied at various periods by nation-states: “History offers many stories
of countries that kept their people out of global education exchange” (Clem-
ent 2004, 3). Staying on the global course—making sure that (economic)
globalization continued—was the best way forward to achieve the goals of
bridging the divide between rich and poor countries.
The issues of mobility, migration, and trade in education were salient in
several presentations. Having observed that demand for cross-border edu-
cation was partly migration related, the OECD presenter provided a slew of
statistics to illustrate student mobilities: 96 percent of Chinese doctoral grad-
uates and 86 percent of doctoral graduates from India settle in the United
States after completing their study, rather than returning home (Vincent-
Lancrin 2004, 32). This might once have been considered “brain drain,” but
the high status accorded to mobility means that new truths are being nor-
malized—“brain circulation” is now the preferred term. International stu-
dents “do not transfer completely but retain active links with their country
of origin by reinvesting, sending remittances and migrating back” (Vincent-
Lancrin 2004, 32). New Zealand’s education minister was similarly enthusi-
astic about the transnationality of his country’s citizens, noting that “20% of
the population of New Zealand lives offshore. . . . This is not brain drain;
They are ambassadors. . . . There are tremendous advantages to a country
that relies heavily on trade” (Mallard 2004).
Somewhat surprising was the limited exploration within these brain-mo-
bility narratives of the changing proprietary regimes accompanying the knowl-
edge trade. As demonstrated by the TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights) agreement, intellectual-property regimes impose
particular burdens on developing countries, which face paying significant
royalties for the outputs of some of their brightest nationals who may have
completed most of their education and training in their home country. What
is clear is that the development of knowledge is viewed as a highly individ-
ualized endeavor (May 2004). Its public benefits are realized by the rewarding
of private rights, with no acknowledgment of contributions made by the
creator’s country of origin, even though individuals may have completed
most of their education in their home country.
As with the first forum, considerable effort was invested by various pre-
senters to highlight the “sovereignty clause” within GATS. A particularly con-
vincing performance was provided by the director of the WTO’s Trade in
Services Division, Hamid Mamdouh, whose presentation sought to give trade
liberalization a democratic face, a patina of equal opportunity, and a level
playing field: “Liberalization means two things: market access to suppliers,
and you treat them as you treat your own providers.” In carefully enunciated
words, he observes: “GATS doesn’t interfere with government ownership.
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. . . Government ownership of particular entities will never be challenged
by the GATS” (Mamdouh 2004). Left unstated was the continuing ambiguity
as to just what constitutes government ownership, particularly in the edu-
cation sphere where hybrid funding models exist. Later, in response to a
question from the floor, he agreed that the relationship between trade lib-
eralization and capacity building is insufficiently clarified.
In the context of a post–Washington consensus, Mamdouh (2004) argued
that it is necessary to entertain a more active role for the regulatory state:
“Under GATS, liberalization does not mean deregulation or privatization.
Regulation is important. . . . The aim of liberalization is not just economic
objectives; we look at more than the bottom line . . . social cultural, envi-
ronmental objectives, [and] respect for national policy objectives.”
This argument left unexplored the unresolved tensions arising from the
WTO’s ethos of progressive liberalization, wherein the rule of the market
overrides treaty-based rights of nation-states to regulate and to respond to
political, economic, and social conditions. The vexing issues of power and
geopolitical asymmetries also have to be airbrushed. In a bid to “keep geo-
politics out of sight and out of mind,” Mamdouh (2004) declared: “WTO
alliances are quite different from the UN. They are not constructed along
North/South lines but along mutual interests. . . . Political divisions don’t
play much of a role. . . . The trading weight of nation-states is not a decisive factor
in determining their effectiveness in negotiating rules in WTO negotiations” (emphasis
added).
Such claims that the WTO is a level playing field on which neither geopo-
litical alliances nor trading weights are decisive influences in negotiations
have been robustly refuted by development and international trade scholars
and activists. Also contestable was Mamdouh’s assessment that the risk to
education posed by for-profit, transnational education companies remains
minimal since “education is not considered low hanging fruit” (trade parlance
for a priority sector offering strong commercial returns). Again, it is debatable
whether this reasoning, along with the reassurance that “the WTO is aware
of education’s social responsibilities” (Mamdouh 2004) is sufficient to ensure
that GATS does not delimit education’s public-good functions.
In settings such as this, publicizing the WTO’s credentials as a responsible
global citizen is paramount: “We are trying to obtain a reconciliation between
trade and development” (Mamdouh 2004). The role of activist, transnational
social movements in pushing the WTO toward greater engagement with social
issues, however, appears to be less welcome: “[The] WTO has a high political
profile and people who participate don’t have the expertise but go because they
are important enough. [The] WTO has a more complex legal framework.
. . . [So, you] have more complexity and less expertise. You need more speci-
alisation, not more participation” (Mamdouh 2004; emphasis added).
Given the strong presence at the forum of senior education bureaucrats,
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education marketing personnel, and university executive managers, it was
not surprising to find little resistance to the trade narratives in public dis-
cussions. However, on the last day of the forum an irate delegate from Ar-
gentina attempted to steer the discussions away from the realm of the tech-
nical and technological toward the political with a sharp criticism of the
implied neutrality of transnational education: “What are you educating peo-
ple for? This has not been discussed at all. . . . We need to build citizenship
and enhance our own development in a sustainable way” (discussion, “Build-
ing Capacity in Open and Distance Learning” presentation; Daniel 2004).
The panel delegate Sir John Daniel, representing the Commonwealth As-
sociation of Universities, offered a response premised on the self-governing,
autonomous, choice-exercising individual: “That is an enormous question
and I don’t know where to start. You are referring to values. . . . I agree
there is no neutrality. [However, our] courses are not just off the shelf. So
the business program in [the] UK is very different compared to Australia.
What are our values? I don’t know how to answer that in a short answer. Our
values are that students will be able to look at the evidence and make informed decisions.
. . . Hopefully, they will be the right ones” (emphasis added).
The success of mobilizing transnational resistance to trade in education
will continue to present significant challenges, given that the notion of public
good has shallow transnational roots and especially given the endurance of
cultural and national polarities. Trade in education represents a positive
project for many international students who are unable to secure an edu-
cation in their country of origin. For its opponents, such as education unions,
trade increases the commodification of education, weakens certain disci-
plines, and inculcates privatized, market-like subjectivities in individuals and
institutions to the detriment of the public good (CAUT 2005; Scherrer 2005;
EI 2006).
The themes of quality control and consumer protection in the education-
export industry were particularly salient, with several overseas delegates ex-
pressing concern about the aggressively commercial partnerships between
Australian education bodies and dubious local operators and the quality of
pastoral care provided to students. Reassurances from Australian officials were
expressed through the language of audit—the government audits overseas
partnerships and offshore campuses. However, because audits take place on
a 5-year cycle, they cannot be depended upon to address immediate, pressing
problems of quality. A detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses
of quality assurance regimes and their allied techniques exceeds the scope
of this article (see Vidovich and Currie 1998; Ball 2000; Hodson and Thomas
2001). However, three questions are worth raising in the context of the brief
exploration below on quality assurance in education: How has education
quality come to be visualized in technical and managerial discourse? How
has quality assurance assumed an “objective” power-neutral status, despite
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numerous studies that implicate it as a governmental technology (Shore and
Wright 2000; Charlton 2002)? And how do quality assurance frameworks fix
the identities and actions of their subjects?
Audits of transnational education programs have consistently raised con-
cerns that without exposure to research and staff development opportunities,
casual teaching staff will be stymied in facilitating the higher order critical
thinking skills associated with university-level study. British, Australian, and
American studies of quality assurance programs have noted that audits are
poor custodians of quality (Hodson and Thomas 2001; Charlton 2002; Vi-
dovich 2004). Furthermore, the significant ambiguity surrounding the con-
cept of quality across disciplines, institutional contexts, and social actors
makes quality assurance an elusive goal (Polster and Newson 1998; Hodson
and Thomas 2001; Marginson 2006). None of these concerns were raised in
the forum, aside from a few mild comments by some British panelists on the
issue of resources required to implement quality assurance frameworks.
Technologies of performance such as quality assurance audits “present
themselves as techniques of restoring trust (accountability, transparency)
[but] presuppose and subsequently contribute to a culture of mistrust in-
cluding the transformation of professionals into ‘calculating individuals’ sub-
ject to calculative regimes” (Dean 1999, 169). Also, rationalities—forms of
thought—become governmental only when they are made technical. Gov-
erning education is ultimately only possible with the institutionalization of
quality assurance mechanisms that make the “incommensurable commen-
surable” (Larner and Le Heron 2002, 9; Shore and Wright 2000). Informed
by managerial rationalities and moralities, quality assurance regimes contrib-
ute toward creating self-managing, anxious individuals, while reinventing ed-
ucational institutions into neo-Taylorist institutions (Strathern 2000). Quality
assurance frameworks, then, exemplify global “flows” (Larner and Le Heron
2002). Made up of technical devices, such as software, charts, statistics, reports,
and training manuals, all of which can be disseminated across time and space,
these flows link people and places in specific ways. As disembodied technical
artifacts they are primarily concerned with optimizing performance.
Conclusion
By using governmentality as a conceptual tool, this article has produced
new insights into how particular understandings of “becoming global” are
constructed, legitimized, and used to govern education. Taking as a focal
point two Trade in Education Services forums, the article identified the dis-
cursive strategies that define and delimit the discourse on trade in education
to show how trade liberalization, which has been a mechanism for global
government since the 1980s, is now being embraced in education. These
discursive strategies play a critical role in creating the conditions for an
“epistemic lock in,” wherein a range of state and nonstate authorities from
This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Mon, 21 Sep 2015 22:02:54 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Comparative Education Review 221
GATS AND THE NEW DEVELOPMENTALISM
both developed and developing countries are socialized and acculturated to
engage with the trade-liberalization agenda in education.
The first Trade in Education Services forum in Washington, DC, was
concerned largely with enabling market access through the reduction of
barriers, in particular, mode 3 (commercial presence) and mode 4 (the
movement of natural persons). However, the rhetorical focus of the third
forum shifted to how trade in education could contribute to capacity building
and development. Liberalization was linked to capacity building to make it
a more inclusive and congenial discourse. The net effect of both forums was
to create the conditions for knowledge of a particular kind, from which
various truths could be used to govern. What were these truths?
First, trade liberalization is an important developmental tool; it will help
to reconstitute countries that are presently importers of education into so-
phisticated knowledge economies. Allied to trade as a positive project of
governance was its depiction as the means toward supplementing and
strengthening public education systems by creating the conditions for quality
education services. However, quality regimes function as disciplinary instru-
ments that have the potential to subject educators and educational institutions
to specific ways of conducting themselves, namely, optimizing performance
ahead of other conduct. Furthermore, research has shown that quality frame-
works have a poor record in ensuring good educational experiences for
students (Charlton 2002; Marginson 2006).
A second regime of truth was concerned with upholding the sanctity of
national sovereignty. Nation-states and their governments were constructed
in discourse as willing participants in all facets of liberalization. The principle
of voluntarism implied in the GATS discourse on trade in education also
creates the conditions for making all nations participating responsible for
the outcomes and effects of trade liberalization. As willing partners in capacity
building and liberalization, countries cannot claim oppression or exploitation
if liberalization in education services subsequently fails to deliver knowledge-
economy dividends.
In conclusion, the salience of the capacity-building thematic in the third
forum appeared to be indicative of the emergence of a softer, more inclusive
and humanitarian discourse. However, on closer analysis, the rationalities and
practices, knowledges, and institutional frameworks that constitute capacity
building can be seen to derive inspiration and impetus from norms and codes
that are inherently neoliberal. These norms rest on the notion of trade
liberalization as the means to advancement and betterment for all. It can be
argued then, that the legitimacy and sustainability of neoliberal governance
derives from a host of discursive reinventions that call on new strategies and
knowledges, using new configurations of humanitarianism, freedom, em-
powerment, and choice.
Why is trade in education regarded now as the means toward successful
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capacity building of education institutions in the majority (developing) world,
where previously international aid and nation building were seen as the
solution to building institutional capacity? The answer to this question is
complex. While the arena of international trade is not immune to exercises
of illiberal governmentality, top-down applications of power are only part of
the answer toward understanding the spatial reach of trade liberalization. It
is also important to understand the productive possibilities offered by new
articulations of neoliberal governance, including the extent to which neolib-
eral discourses are embodied by individual policy makers, educators, and
higher-education administrators. Understanding how the bureaucratic and
professional classes in both the North and South have embraced, and si-
multaneously been steered toward, the belief that trade liberalization is a
legitimate, effective, and humanitarian developmental tool—with a chance
to alleviate global inequality—requires further investigation.
Some of the most highly cited works on the implications of GATS for
higher education are academic papers arising from consultancy reports
funded by bodies such as the OECD and undertaken by various private con-
sultants and researchers to construct a “knowledge economy of capacity build-
ing” (see Phillips and Ilcan 2004). One area that merits further study is how
epistemic communities have themselves been the target of governmental
strategies, subject to the grant and tender economy and the workings of the
“enterprise university” (see Marginson and Considine 2000; Slaughter and
Rhoades 2004; Washburn 2005), with the consequence of producing partic-
ular kinds of knowledge about trade and education. Despite claims by some
consultants that they have adopted an “education-centered, international
approach” that attends to the implications of GATS for both developing and
developed countries (see Knight 2003), as a general observation, research
and discussion papers and reports are often based on depoliticized and ahis-
torical analyses of the processes and outcomes likely to flow from the new
multilateralisms being flagged by GATS. As Nederveen Pieterse (2004, 76)
observes, “most research and policy accounts . . . tend to be ahistorical and
apolitical; in view of their reliance on neoclassical economics they are atheo-
retical as well. Their matter-of-factness is impression management only; under
the surface are many conflicts about measurements and their implications.”
Despite optimistic claims by some media commentators that “the world
is flattening out” to become a series of level playing fields (Friedman 2005;
see also Wolf 2005), there are many other signs that what is in place is a
positional hierarchy of nation-states, regions, institutions, and individuals or-
dered by the grids of economic success and integration into the global econ-
omy. The current brand of transnational neoliberalism, which is sponsored
by governing elites and informed by principles of trade liberalization and
comparative advantage, is bolstered by global knowledge practices, expertise,
and calculative mechanisms such as quality assurance frameworks. Introduc-
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ing a humanitarian discourse, such as capacity building with its attendant
notions of inclusion and partnership, helps to establish new ways of governing
populations and geographies. At first blush, these discursive practices suggest
a welcome relief from the harsh neoliberalisms that have characterized struc-
tural adjustment programs. However, their reconfigured neoliberal under-
pinnings have similar biopolitical and geopolitical effects, namely, recali-
brating the moral worth of individuals, groups, and countries according to
whether they have the right attributes, dispositions, and knowledge bases for
a particular definition of economic success.
The implications of these new articulations of neoliberalism for higher
education are potentially immense. There are signs that trade imperatives
will further reduce higher education’s capacity and commitment to attain
the “right” balance between service and critique, resulting in power/knowl-
edge practices that are complicit with and contribute toward graduated sov-
ereignties and illiberal governmentalities. These developments will do little
to further global justice.
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